Bitter: PapRAT and three infection chains targeting South Asia
FortiGuard Labs attributes to Bitter an espionage campaign using the PapRAT RAT, MSI packages, LNK files and a malware-free chain built on ftp.exe.

On 2 November FortiGuard Labs, Fortinet’s research team, published an analysis of an espionage campaign against organisations in South Asia and attributed it “with high confidence” to Bitter, a group also tracked as TA397. At its core is PapRAT, a remote access trojan (RAT) developed by the group, used alongside tools already built into Windows. The story was covered the same day by Infosecurity Magazine and Dark Reading, and on 9 November by The Hacker News. Of the three articles, we were only able to read Infosecurity Magazine’s in full: the technical details that follow come from it unless stated otherwise.
What happened
- FortiGuard Labs researcher Cara Lin tracked the campaign over several months.
- The stated targets are South Asian organisations, but FortiGuard’s telemetry also shows activity in Southeast Asia and South Korea.
- The lures have a diplomatic theme: a bilateral meeting request, an ambassador’s letter about the 11th Belt and Road Summit and a 2026 gala dinner invitation.
- The attribution is based on lure file names, command-and-control (C2) patterns, file metadata and malware analysis.
Dark Reading describes Bitter as an India-linked group and reports growing attacks in the region; Infosecurity Magazine calls it a suspected South Asian espionage group.
The three infection chains
The first chain installs no actual malware. A malicious Windows shortcut (.lnk file) abuses ftp.exe, the FTP client shipped with the system, to run scripts and create scheduled tasks. The tasks use curl to fetch new commands from the attackers’ servers. According to FortiGuard, this lets operators change their instructions on the server without pushing a new executable. FortiGuard found no PapRAT in this chain: only the shortcut, Windows tools, scripts and scheduled tasks.
The other two chains install PapRAT through a Windows Installer (MSI) package:
- in one, the package is hidden in a VHDX virtual disk image, together with a decoy spreadsheet;
- in the other, it is downloaded via an internet shortcut (.url file) inside a RAR archive.
PapRAT and WmRAT
- The C++ build of PapRAT poses as a Microsoft component, beacons to the C2 over plaintext HTTP and supports eight commands, including remote shell, file transfer and screenshots.
- A more recently obtained Rust variant switches to HTTPS and adds three commands: PowerShell execution, pause and exit.
- In the third chain, as numbered by FortiGuard, PapRAT downloaded WmRAT, a C++ RAT previously documented by other researchers: FortiGuard sees it as a further link between the campaign and Bitter.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques
Our mapping, based on the activity described:
- T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File) for the .lnk, .url and MSI files opened by the victim;
- T1202 (Indirect Command Execution) for the use of
ftp.exeas a script runner; - T1053.005 (Scheduled Task) for persistence;
- T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) for the commands fetched with
curland for WmRAT; - T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec) for the MSI packages;
- T1036 (Masquerading) for PapRAT posing as a Microsoft component;
- T1071.001 (Web Protocols), T1059.001 (PowerShell) and T1113 (Screen Capture) for the RAT’s features.
Indicators of compromise: the sources we consulted do not list hashes, domains or addresses. They should be taken from the FortiGuard Labs report.
Impact for European and Italian organisations
The sources mention no victims in Europe. The lure themes, however, point to government and diplomatic targets and those who work with them: ministries, embassies, agencies and companies with ties to South Asia. The techniques apply everywhere: shortcuts, virtual disks and MSI packages are common vectors, and the first chain relies on system programs alone. As Shane Barney, CISO at Keeper Security, told Infosecurity Magazine, when an intrusion uses trusted system processes, signature-based controls have nothing to alert on. For public administrations and entities within the scope of NIS2, controlling these vectors is part of the risk management the directive requires.
What to do now
- Filter the formats used as lures: block or quarantine .lnk, .url, .vhd/.vhdx files and the archives containing them when they come from outside. Consider preventing users from mounting virtual disks.
- Restrict MSI packages: use application control rules to block MSI installs from user folders and downloads, and remove standing administrator rights.
- Hunt in your logs:
ftp.exestarted with a script (-s:option) or from a shortcut; recently created scheduled tasks that launchcurl.exe; processes posing as Microsoft components that run from user folders and regularly contact unknown servers. - Enable PowerShell logging (script block logging), useful against the Rust variant.
- Import the indicators from the FortiGuard report and search back several months, given how long the campaign has run.
- Clean up thoroughly: as Jason Soroko of Sectigo warned, searching for PapRAT alone may miss part of the campaign, and removing the first implant found may not be enough to evict the attacker. Check scheduled tasks, WmRAT and other access paths before closing the incident.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Sentry collects logs and security events from computers, servers and firewalls and brings them into the SOC pages, where suspicious executions and new persistence mechanisms land in their own event families. ARX Shield integrates the antivirus/EDR console, shows open vulnerabilities and lets you isolate a suspicious machine from the network. ARX Trace launches collections and searches across multiple machines, to look for scheduled tasks and indicators across the whole fleet, with MITRE ATT&CK mapping. ARX Horizon lets you search for indicators of compromise and enriches every event with threat intelligence sources.
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