All articles

NewsNovember 9, 20265 min read

CERT-FR attributes French refrigeration attacks to Iran’s IRGC

France’s C4 blames two Iranian IRGC units for sabotaging refrigeration at about 700 retail sites, the Charlie Hebdo attack and a Paris 2024 intrusion.

Red stamp reading “SECURITY BREACH” on a white background

On 9 November 2026 CERT-FR published report CERTFR-2026-CTI-009 (TLP:CLEAR), making an attribution public: the Centre de Coordination des Crises Cyber (C4), the French interministerial body that brings together ANSSI, COMCYBER, DGA, DGSE and DGSI, attributes several attacks on French interests to two offensive cyber units of the Electronic and Cyber Centre of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-CEC): Shahid Kaveh and Shahid Shoostari.

The most serious case is the attack of 11 and 12 October 2026 on refrigeration controllers in large-scale retail, which the report describes as unprecedented in scale and aggressiveness. We have already covered it on ARX News: below we focus on what the report adds. CERT-FR also links to the attribution statement of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and to a press release from the Paris prosecutor’s office. All the facts that follow come from this single source.

The attack on refrigeration controllers (October 2026)

According to the report, the C4 was alerted on 12 October 2026 to an attack on the refrigeration controllers of about 700 large retail sites in France. After they were compromised, during the night between Sunday 11 and Monday 12 October, the defrost parameters were set to high temperatures. The consequences reported by CERT-FR:

  • significant loss of goods;
  • in at least 15 cases, outbreaks of fire;
  • victims mostly in large-scale retail (the report names the Casino, Leclerc, Coopérative U, Metro, Carrefour and Intermarché groups), but also in the agri-food sector: small butcher shops, a slaughterhouse and cooperative food plants.

The C4 also links to the same attack the concurrent targeting of Schneider Electric equipment at small hydroelectric plants in France, with moderate effects.

The report does not name the manufacturer of the refrigeration controllers and does not comment on later incidents in France and Europe.

The attribution evidence

The C4 names the IRGC as the sponsor and the Shahid Kaveh unit as the perpetrator, based on a “body of evidence”:

  • the same infrastructure was used, in the same period, for reconnaissance on Schneider Electric equipment used in small and medium energy and water production units, with techniques the unit has used since at least April 2026 (Modbus on port 502);
  • for the attack, the operators used the FOFA scanning tool, routinely used by the same attack mode of operation;
  • the attack was relayed from 13 October 2026 on CyberbanNews, the propaganda outlet associated with the unit;
  • traces of Farsi were found in the attack infrastructure.

Who Shahid Kaveh is

According to CERT-FR, the unit is led by Reza Salarvand and Mahdi Lashgarian; the IRGC-CEC is headed by Hamid Reza Lashgarian. It appears online through “hacktivist” personas tasked with claiming attacks: CyberAveng3rs, Soldiers of Solomon, Mr. Soul, Cyber Isnaad Front, as well as CyberbanNews.

The unit runs large-scale campaigns against industrial equipment for sabotage, mainly against Israel and the United States, but also against France and other European countries. The report recalls:

  • the November 2023 campaign claimed as CyberAveng3rs against the Israeli company Unitronics, which makes industrial control systems also used in the United States and Europe;
  • a sabotage campaign in March and April 2026 against Israeli and US interests, including Israeli refrigeration equipment;
  • since at least June 2024, scripts to scan, access and control Schneider Electric, Siemens and Rockwell equipment;
  • in April 2026, mass reconnaissance via Modbus (port 502) on Schneider Electric systems, including in France.

Shahid Shoostari: Charlie Hebdo and Paris 2024

The second unit, known in open sources as Emennet Pasargad or Iliyanet, has acted against France since at least 2020 for destabilisation purposes. The C4 confirms:

  • the 2020 activity against Charlie Hebdo, made public in 2021 by Lab Dookhtegan, a group presenting itself as an Iranian dissident hacktivist organisation, and the attack of 4 January 2023: defacement of the magazine’s online shop and exfiltration of the data in its database;
  • the compromise, from 20 July 2024, of a French company running a video display (digital signage) system: the attackers tried to broadcast photomontages denouncing the participation of Israeli athletes in the Paris Games. The intrusion, which could have affected all the company’s customers, was discovered before the images were shown. The investigation, from 25 July, found malicious activity several days earlier, tools already associated with Emennet Pasargad by security vendors and international partners, and two IP addresses belonging to Iranian ISPs.

Techniques and indicators

The report does not publish technical indicators (IP addresses, attack domains, hashes). From the facts described, our MITRE ATT&CK reading: T1596.005 (Scan Databases) for the use of FOFA, T0846 (Remote System Discovery) for the Modbus reconnaissance, T0836 (Modify Parameter) and T0879 (Damage to Property) for the forced defrost and its effects, T1491.002 (External Defacement) for Charlie Hebdo.

Impact for European and Italian companies

The attribution confirms that OT systems exposed to the Internet, such as refrigeration controllers or energy and water plants, are targets of a state actor aiming for physical damage, in Europe too. Food distribution, energy and water are NIS2 sectors: for Italian entities in scope (Legislative Decree 138/2024), the compromise of a plant is an incident to assess for notification to the ACN’s CSIRT Italia.

What to do now

  1. No OT interface on the Internet: controllers, PLCs and supervision systems reachable only from a separate management network or a VPN with multi-factor authentication.
  2. Block Modbus/TCP (port 502) from outside and check firewall logs for connection attempts to that port.
  3. Check the exposure of your public addresses as an attacker would with an engine such as FOFA: open ports and recognisable products.
  4. Inventory Schneider Electric, Siemens and Rockwell equipment and refrigeration controllers, with firmware and vendors’ remote access.
  5. Parameters and alarms: compare set points and defrost settings with the approved configuration and add temperature alarms independent of the controller.
  6. Digital signage: treat content management systems as exposed systems, with personal accounts and access logs.

How ARXDOME helps

ARX Expose shows what an attacker sees from outside: open ports and recognised products on your company’s public addresses. ARX Radar reads incoming firewall traffic every minute and recognises port scans, with a dossier on each source. ARX Watch finds devices on the network with nothing installed on them, such as plant controllers, and alerts you when a new one appears.

Last updated:

Any questions?

Let’s talk about your company’s needs, with no obligation.

Contact us

Related articles