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NewsNovember 5, 20265 min read

DigiCert: system exposed for 16 months, customer data breached

A server migration exposed an internal DigiCert system to the internet: a self-registered account read customer data and identity documents.

Green seal with a padlock and the words SSL certified and secure transaction

DigiCert, one of the leading certificate authorities (CAs), has started notifying customers of a data breach. An internal system used to archive customer information was mistakenly left reachable from the internet after a migration in February 2025 and, between 27 June and 2 July 2026, an account created by an outsider used it to read part of the archive. The data includes names, business contact details and, for some people, identity documents. The details come from the incident report DigiCert published on Mozilla’s Bugzilla and from the customer notifications, as reported by BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek, The Register, The Record and DataBreaches.net.

What happened

The timeline reconstructed from the sources:

  • February 2025: an internal business system, previously reachable only through a VPN, is moved to a different network segment (The Register speaks of a different availability zone) and becomes reachable from the internet without anyone noticing;
  • June 2026: DigiCert finds unauthorised accounts on the system. According to The Register it discovers them on 18 June, and three days later a researcher reports the account-creation issue; The Record quotes the report, which says that from 21 June the company determined the system was externally accessible. At first the accounts are judged harmless, because they are not assigned to any application;
  • 27 June – 2 July: an unauthorised account browses the archived data; on 2 July DigiCert blocks it and fixes the issue;
  • 12 October: the company starts checking whether data was accessed;
  • 19 October: it confirms access to a subset of archived records and classifies it as a reportable event.

The report itself, quoted by BleepingComputer, acknowledges that the incident was initially handled as an account-creation issue rather than a data-access event. More than three months pass between blocking the account and confirming the access.

The technical chain

The system used the same account management platform as the customer-facing products, including a self-registration feature intended for other applications that was never supposed to be active there. Anyone who could reach the system could create an account without multi-factor authentication (SecurityWeek, The Register). An authorisation flaw then let these accounts, although not assigned to any application, read the archived data in read-only mode (BleepingComputer).

In the report, as cited by The Record, DigiCert names two causes: the migration was treated as an infrastructure change rather than a security change, which would have required a more detailed review and sign-off; and the system had no alerting on new account creation through the exposed endpoint or on request volume.

In MITRE ATT&CK terms, the sequence maps to abuse of an exposed application (T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application), account creation (T1136 Create Account) and collection from an application repository (T1213 Data from Information Repositories). No indicators of compromise have been published.

What data, and what was not touched

According to the customer notification, the data involved is names, business email addresses, phone numbers and business addresses and, where provided, identity documents such as driving licences, passports, utility bills or other documents showing name and address. DigiCert is still reviewing the documents to identify the individuals concerned and will notify them once the review is complete. The number of people affected has not been disclosed: the company speaks of a small portion of the archive.

The account could not modify records, approve validations or issue certificates. DigiCert states that the CA systems sit on separate network segments and that CertCentral, DigiCert ONE, customer credentials and issued certificates were not compromised; according to The Register there is no evidence that the account was used to issue, revoke or validate certificates. A spokesperson told The Record there is no evidence of misuse of the data and that the incident has been reported to law enforcement. Public disclosure was required by the root programme rules of Mozilla, Google Chrome, Microsoft and Apple.

Why it matters to European companies

Anyone requesting a certificate from a CA may have to provide documents for validation: the notification mentions it, and a customer post quoted by BleepingComputer confirms it. The Record reports concerns raised on social media that identity documents could be linked to specific certificates. For those receiving the notification, the most concrete risk is targeted phishing in the CA’s name, using genuine details of validation requests, as well as misuse of the documents for identity fraud.

For NIS2 entities, Article 21 requires managing supply chain security, and a CA is a critical supplier. The case is also a useful lesson for anyone running infrastructure: a migration changes exposure, and an internal application with self-registration and overly broad permissions becomes an open door.

What to do now

If your company is a DigiCert customer:

  • check whether the people who handled validation requests have received the notification, and involve your DPO;
  • warn administrators and contacts: urgent requests for renewal, revalidation or payment in the CA’s name should be verified through the official portal, not through links in emails;
  • check the Certificate Transparency logs for certificates for your domains that you did not request: DigiCert rules out issuance, but the check costs little.

For your own systems:

  • treat network migrations as security changes, with an exposure check before and after;
  • disable self-registration on internal applications and deny everything by default: an account without a role should see nothing;
  • set up alerts on account creation and on anomalous request volumes;
  • when you find unauthorised accounts, always check data access too, not just account creation.

How ARXDOME helps

ARX Expose looks at your company from the outside every day and shows only what has changed since the last check, such as a new port or service: exactly the signal that appears when a migration mistakenly exposes an internal system. ARX Scout verifies first-hand which ports are actually open. On monitored machines, ARX Sentry shows account changes in its identity pages, so an unexpected account creation does not go unnoticed.

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