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NewsNovember 5, 20266 min read

Residential proxies exiting through the White House network

For 30 days, 28 residential proxy services routed traffic out of six White House addresses. What was found, the risks and the checks to run now.

Hand touching a digital world map with interconnected network points

On 4 November 2026, US threat intelligence firm Layer3 Intel published research showing that the White House network had been used as an exit point for residential proxy services: for weeks, anyone who bought access to one of these services could make their traffic appear to come from addresses of the Executive Office of the President. The story was picked up by Krebs on Security, Infosecurity Magazine, The Register, Help Net Security, SecurityWeek, CSO Online and Security Affairs.

Layer3 does not report any compromise of White House systems and stresses that its data shows the exits, not the device or the person behind them. Still, the case is a concrete example of a problem that affects corporate networks too.

What happened

Layer3 spotted the activity in its new Residential Proxy Observatory, which collects the data from its queries to residential proxy services. The company says it did not target the network: it requested ordinary global “rotating” exits from the services, and some of them landed on AS2650, the autonomous system registered to the Executive Office of the President.

The figures reported consistently by the outlets:

  • 236 exits from AS2650 between 5 October and 3 November 2026;
  • from six IP addresses, on 26 of the 30 days;
  • through 28 different residential proxy services.

To rule out an error, Layer3 checked the addresses against the public pages of Spur and Synthient, two proxy tracking services: both classify them as residential proxy exits.

According to Infosecurity Magazine and Help Net Security, about half of the activity falls between 5 p.m. and midnight Eastern Time, with almost none in the early morning. For Layer3 this pattern points to a person regularly on the network in the evening, with a device carrying a proxy SDK, rather than to a guest Wi-Fi network.

Layer3 founder Sergiy Usatyuk told Infosecurity Magazine and The Register that the latest activity was on the evening of 4 November, a few hours after publication, and that it then stopped. The logs were shared with a federal agency; according to The Register, it was the State Department that requested them. Usatyuk adds that Layer3’s data goes back to 10 July and that the addresses had probably been in use for some time. The White House did not comment.

Technical details

How a residential proxy works. The service sells access to the connections of everyday devices (computers, phones, TVs): the customer’s traffic leaves from the device’s IP address, and to the destination site it looks like any user on that network. Many devices join these networks through SDKs embedded in free apps: the developer earns a small fee per installation, and the user often does not notice. The Register recalls an FBI bulletin from March that also lists malware, illicit SDK deals and VPNs with hidden terms among the ways a device becomes a node without consent.

The devices involved. Information on the devices comes only from Synthient and is reported with different details:

  • Krebs on Security and SecurityWeek mention Windows 11 machines with the Infatica SDK;
  • The Register and Help Net Security report a second Synthient message about several Windows 10 and 11 machines talking to the providers Geonode, Infatica and Mellowtel;
  • only Help Net Security reports that Synthient points “with high confidence” to the Rave app, used to watch videos together, which reportedly bundles 12 proxy SDKs.

The sources diverge on Infatica: SecurityWeek describes it as a Singapore-based company; Krebs calls it Russian and notes that its founder Vladimir Fomenko also owns King Servers, the provider that in 2016 hosted six of the eight addresses used in the attacks on election systems in Arizona and Illinois.

The technical risk. The issue is not just the “borrowed” address. Layer3 recalls that poorly secured proxy SDKs have already allowed internal network access and lateral movement: the Kimwolf botnet, documented by Synthient, reached at least 2 million devices, mostly Android with an exposed ADB service, precisely through residential proxy networks. If an SDK on the White House network had the same flaw, anyone buying access could reach internal systems. Layer3 presents this risk as conditional. Krebs adds that in January 2026 dozens of services had to fix a flaw of this kind and quotes Synthient on resale prices as low as 60 cents per gigabyte, often without customer identity checks.

MITRE ATT&CK (our mapping, for how attackers use these networks): T1090 (Proxy), T1584 (Compromise Infrastructure) when nodes are obtained without consent, T1021 and T1210 for the hypothesised lateral movement.

Impact for European and Italian companies

The case is not isolated. According to Spur data cited by Krebs, in January 2026 residential proxies were found in nearly 300 government networks, 318 utilities, 166 healthcare companies and hospitals and 141 banking and finance companies; Infoblox found that 65% of its customers query at least one domain linked to these services.

For a company the consequences are twofold. First, your public address is used for other people’s traffic (account takeover, fraud, scraping) and can end up on reputation lists, with blocks towards customers and suppliers. Second, a vulnerable SDK is a door into the internal network, opened from outside by anyone who pays a few euros. For NIS2 entities this touches asset management, network security and device usage rules (Article 21); in healthcare, where personal devices on the ward are common, network separation is decisive.

What to do now

  1. Check your public addresses on the lookup pages of proxy detection services: it is the same check Layer3 used.
  2. Separate personal and guest devices from the corporate network, with dedicated VLANs and no access to internal systems.
  3. Take a software inventory of computers and servers and look for unauthorised free apps (streaming, free VPNs, utilities) that may contain proxy SDKs; restrict installation with application allow lists.
  4. Monitor DNS and outbound traffic: lookups of residential proxy provider domains and persistent connections to their infrastructure, including outside working hours.
  5. Filter egress: networks that do not need it should not be able to open arbitrary connections to the internet.
  6. Update device usage rules: anyone bringing a device onto the network should know that “free” apps can resell the company’s connection.

How ARXDOME helps

ARX Sentry collects the inventory of software installed on computers and servers and brings firewall logs, including blocked outbound traffic, into the SOC pages and the NOC map. ARX Watch finds devices without a probe on the network, such as guest laptops or personal devices, and alerts you when a new one appears. ARX Horizon enriches every address with country, provider, reputation and Tor, VPN or cloud membership, so anomalous connections can be read at a glance.

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