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NewsNovember 11, 20265 min read

ScreenConnect: RMM+ extension and SCKit malware hit MSPs

Six MSPs and 288 endpoints hit through the ScreenConnect RMM+ extension: rogue remote clients, SCKit malware, indicators and what to do right now.

Technician sitting in front of several monitors at a control workstation

On 11 November 2026 Huntress detected a campaign, started around 17:47 UTC, against cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances. The attacker used the Run Command feature to install, on customer devices, copies of ScreenConnect connected to their own servers. According to Huntress’s latest count, at least 6 MSPs have been compromised, with 288 endpoints across 48 organizations: about a third were reached in the first 10 minutes, all of them within 90 minutes.

ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to some partner accounts and the installation of unauthorized remote access software, but says it has no evidence of a compromise of its own infrastructure or of a vulnerability in ScreenConnect.

The entry point: the RMM+ extension

RMM+ is an independent extension, installed from the ScreenConnect marketplace, that exposes an API through which external management tools control sessions without going through the console. It authenticates with a shared access key, so it sits outside ScreenConnect’s accounts, roles and MFA.

According to Huntress’s analysis, in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 the key stays blank if the administrator never configured it, and the check accepts an empty value: anyone who can reach the API can send remote commands. This matches what was seen in the incidents: commands reaching endpoints on several instances with no corresponding logins, and logs pointing to RMM+. Huntress notes that almost all the installations it found were legitimate, added for a project and then forgotten.

In the first hours Huntress suspected stolen credentials or hijacked operator sessions, and ConnectWise still considers the initial access method unconfirmed. According to The Register, installations running ScreenConnect 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 were also hit: the latest server version was not enough.

ConnectWise disabled five extensions of the RMM+ family in about 400 partner cloud environments: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. Their presence alone does not mean compromise. ConnectWise cannot act on on-premises installations: they must be disabled manually and not reinstalled until further guidance.

SCKit: persistence and a trap for technicians

Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber analysed the kit used, called SCKit: 16 scripts and components. The first goal is persistence: ScreenConnect Access clients pointing to attacker servers, so access survives even if the MSP session is closed. According to Huntress, the kit stops the legitimate client and puts the attacker’s copy in its place, reusing the real client’s libraries so the machine looks normal.

The most insidious part is RelayTrap. The C# source (RelayTrap.cs) is downloaded to the endpoint and compiled locally by a PowerShell script; the program replaces the ScreenConnect Guest process, while the TrapWatch component monitors the services. When a technician opens an interactive session, RelayTrap tries to send a file the other way, to the technician’s workstation, exploiting CVE-2026-84869, a file-transfer flaw in the ScreenConnect client fixed in version 26.6.5 (CVSS 9.9 according to CyberScoop). From there, other components try to steal ScreenConnect authentication cookies from the browser, reuse the session without credentials or MFA, and push commands to other endpoints and customers through management features, including the Shared Toolbox.

This propagation has not been seen succeeding: according to Huntress the console takeover attempt failed in every recovered log, and Blackpoint verified that the updated client blocks the exploit. The sources differ on the role of the CVE: The Record reports that Huntress and other researchers link the campaign to CVE-2026-84869, while BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek and CyberScoop describe RMM+ as the entry point and the CVE only as the mechanism for spreading to technicians. The very detailed comments in the code suggest source generated with a language model. No one has attributed the activity to a group.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping (indicative): T1190 (exposed RMM+ API), T1199 (trusted relationship with the MSP), T1072 (software deployment tools), T1219 (remote access software), T1027.004 (compile after delivery), T1539 (steal web session cookie).

Published indicators

Among the indicators released by Huntress:

  • relay 185.99.255[.]28; C2 newnewnew.gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork.homedns[.]org, sc.payproofkit[.]com (155.94.150[.]39); possible C2 cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com;
  • stager hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4;
  • rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091; installer /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited<N>; attacker name “Addmin”;
  • files Panel-Lateral.ps1, runnew.cmd, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, Run-Lateral-Full.bat.

The sequentially numbered tags lead Huntress to think other MSPs were hit earlier. Only BleepingComputer found the ID ed630cc2c873b091 in a malicious script uploaded to VirusTotal in July 2026; its link to this campaign is unclear.

Impact for European companies

The sources do not say which countries were hit, but ScreenConnect is also widespread among European MSPs. MSPs fall under NIS2 (in Italy, Legislative Decree 138/2024) as managed ICT service providers: unauthorized access to the support tool can become a significant incident, for the MSP and for customers in covered sectors, healthcare included. For customers it is a supply chain risk: whoever controls the MSP’s tool runs commands inside their network.

What to do right now

  • Check whether you have any of the five extensions: on-premises, disable them immediately; in the cloud, check they show as disabled; do not reinstall them.
  • Review authentication logs, extension installations, administrative activity and Run Command and Toolbox history, even without alerts; look for unusual sign-ins and bursts of failed logins.
  • Search endpoints for ScreenConnect clients with IDs or servers other than yours, and for the published indicators.
  • Do not open interactive ScreenConnect sessions to suspicious machines: investigate with other security tools.
  • Update ScreenConnect clients to at least 26.6.5.
  • Disabling extensions and changing credentials does not remove what is already installed: clean machines before releasing them from isolation. Huntress saw reinfections minutes after release.
  • As Blackpoint suggests, protect operator sessions and add safeguards around high-impact administrative actions.

How ARXDOME helps

On computers and servers with the ARXDOME agent, ARX Sentry collects the inventory of software, processes and ports: an extra ScreenConnect client, or one connected to an unknown server, becomes visible, and the SOC pages show logins and events per machine. ARX Trace runs collections and hunts across several machines without opening interactive remote sessions, and ARX Shield isolates a suspicious machine with one click, with checks against premature release.

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