Zyxel GS1900: zero-day slips past the patch, 996 switches hit
A flaw other than the one fixed in June let attackers breach 996 Zyxel GS1900 switches in 48 countries. CVE-2026-107441: affected versions and what to do.

Zyxel has fixed CVE-2026-107441, a vulnerability in its GS1900 series switches that was exploited as a zero-day to compromise 996 devices in 48 countries starting in August 2026. There is an important twist: for weeks the attacks were blamed on a different flaw, CVE-2026-7273, which Zyxel had already fixed in June. Anyone who updated their switches in June therefore stayed exposed until the new firmware arrived at the end of October.
Zyxel published its advisory on 3 November 2026. In South Korea, KISA’s KrCERT/CC relayed it on 5 November, with the full list of models and versions.
What happened
- 16 June 2026: Zyxel fixes CVE-2026-7273, a stack-based buffer overflow in the GS1900 CGI program (CVSS 8.8), with firmware 2.90(XXXX.2)C0.
- From around 17 August: according to GreyNoise, an actor compromises 996 GS1900 switches in 48 countries. After executing commands remotely, a script collects the devices’ configuration, network information and hashed root credentials.
- 21 September: GreyNoise discloses the campaign and attributes it to CVE-2026-7273; the same day CISA adds the flaw to its KEV catalog of exploited vulnerabilities.
- 28 September: Binarly, which was analysing the same attacker’s infrastructure, confirms that the exploit works against all ten firmware releases already fixed in June.
- 29 September – 11 October: Binarly reports the issue to Zyxel, which confirms a new vulnerability and assigns CVE-2026-107441.
- 22 October: fixed firmware is released (SecurityWeek says 23 October); on 3 November Zyxel’s advisory and Binarly’s research follow.
According to BleepingComputer, GreyNoise attributes the attacks to a suspected Chinese-speaking actor tracked as Kapibala and links it to the Red Heron campaign, which Acronis had documented against instances of the self-hosted Git service Gitea. SecurityWeek reports that the attacks used variants of the JITTERLY backdoor and the SIXZUT rootkit.
Technical details
- Vulnerability: CVE-2026-107441, an out-of-bounds write in the CGI program of the GS1900 web management interface. An unauthenticated attacker can execute operating system commands through crafted HTTP requests; according to Infosecurity Magazine the commands run with root privileges.
- Mechanism: according to Binarly, the June fix added a check that only ran after the unsafe data copy had already taken place. BleepingComputer explains that the attacker corrupts a parameter counter before it is validated. Zyxel treated the flaw as separate because the exploit also abuses missing length validation of HTTP parameters. The new firmware limits parameter size and checks their number before copying them into memory.
- Disputed severity: Zyxel rates it CVSS 8.8 and describes an attacker on the local network; Binarly rates it 9.8, because reaching the switch’s management service is enough.
- Affected versions: all 2.90 Patch 2 (XXXX.2)C0 builds and earlier, including the June ones. The fix is in the 2.90 Patch 3 (XXXX.3)C0 builds.
- Public indicators: on the attacker’s command server Binarly found the archive
gs1900_bundle.tar.gz, containing a Python 3.10 script,exp.py, obfuscated with PyArmor, which targets/cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgi. According to Help Net Security, Binarly believes the exploit was generated with a language model. - MITRE ATT&CK: exploitation of the management interface (T1190 if reachable from the Internet, T1210 from the internal network) and collection of the device configuration (T1602.002, Network Device Configuration Dump).
It is not clear whether the exploit was built to bypass the June patch or had always targeted a defect that patch failed to fix: BleepingComputer says so explicitly. Binarly offers two hypotheses: either the fix, description and score of CVE-2026-7273 were wrong, or the attacks used another flaw and the link to CVE-2026-7273 was mistaken.
Models and fixed firmware
| Model | Fixed firmware |
|---|---|
| GS1900-8 | 2.90(AAHH.3)C0 |
| GS1900-8HP | 2.90(AAHI.3)C0 |
| GS1900-10HP | 2.90(AAZI.3)C0 |
| GS1900-16 | 2.90(AAHJ.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24 | 2.90(AAHL.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24E | 2.90(AAHK.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24EP | 2.90(ABTO.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24HPv2 | 2.90(ABTP.3)C0 |
| GS1900-48 | 2.90(AAHN.3)C0 |
| GS1900-48HPv2 | 2.90(ABTQ.3)C0 |
Impact for European and Italian organisations
A compromised switch hands the attacker a map of the network: as CSO Online points out, configurations, addresses and credential hashes are a good starting point for moving deeper into the infrastructure. The case also shows a practical limit: anyone who followed the June advisory to the letter appeared “up to date” but was not protected. Binarly’s conclusion is that advisories and version numbers help, but are not enough.
For entities in scope of NIS2, vulnerability management of network devices is part of the required security measures; if signs of compromise are found, the incident must be assessed for notification to the national CSIRT (in Italy, CSIRT Italia at ACN). In healthcare, and wherever the network connects critical systems, access to switch management should be treated as privileged administrative access.
What to do now
- Inventory: identify every GS1900 switch and its firmware version. Any (XXXX.2)C0 build or earlier is vulnerable, even if installed in June.
- Update to the (XXXX.3)C0 build for your model, as listed in the table.
- Restrict the management interface: never exposed to the Internet, reachable only from a management VLAN or a short list of workstations.
- Look for signs of compromise, as Help Net Security advises: requests to
/cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgifrom addresses that do not belong to administrators, unexpected configuration changes, connections from the switches to external addresses. - If you suspect a compromise: change the root and administrator passwords on the switches, and anywhere they were reused, and replace any secrets stored in the configuration.
- Other Zyxel devices: on the same day Zyxel published a second advisory, for a buffer overflow (CVE-2026-76955) in access points, FWA7 and security routers, also relayed by KISA. Check those too.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Watch finds devices on the company network that have no probe installed, such as unlisted network equipment, so no switch is left out of the inventory. ARX Expose shows what can be seen of your company from the Internet, and ARX Scout checks, with your authorisation, which ports and services are actually open: a management interface exposed by mistake shows up right away. ARX Sentry collects firewall logs, where anomalous outbound connections from network devices also appear.
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