Apache HTTP Server: critical mod_http2 RCE (CVE-2026-119618)
CVE-2026-119618: a race condition in mod_http2 of Apache 2.4.55–2.4.70 allows unauthenticated RCE when HTTP/2 is on. Fixed in 2.4.71, no known attacks.

On 11 November 2026 the Apache Software Foundation released Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71, which fixes CVE-2026-119618, a critical vulnerability in the HTTP/2 module (mod_http2). A remote attacker, with no credentials and no user interaction, can corrupt the server’s heap memory and go on to execute code with the privileges of the Apache process. The flaw is reachable only if HTTP/2 is enabled on the service.
It has been covered, among others, by advisories from Ireland’s NCSC, Luxembourg’s CIRCL, Latvia’s CERT.LV, INCIBE-CERT, Korea’s KrCERT/CC and Uruguay’s CERTuy, as well as by SecurityWeek and BleepingComputer.
Technical details
- CVE: CVE-2026-119618, classified as CWE-362 (concurrent execution using a shared resource with improper synchronization).
- Affected versions: Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55 to 2.4.70; also the separately distributed mod_h2 2.0.8 to 2.0.42.
- Fixed version: 2.4.71, or distribution packages that include the backported fix.
- Severity: Apache rates it critical; the CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 (
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) was assigned by Red Hat and repeated by Ireland’s NCSC and CERTuy. BleepingComputer reported that, when Wiz published its analysis, no official score was available yet.
The bug is in the assign_headers() function of mod_http2. While HTTP/2 streams are processed concurrently, one thread can write into a header table that belongs to another execution context. According to CERTuy, the trigger is an HTTP/2 request with no body that carries Content-Type but no Content-Length: Apache adds Content-Length: 0 on its own, and does so on a shared structure. The concurrent write corrupts the heap, causing a process crash or, in the worst case, code execution. CIRCL explains that the fix (commit 824beab in modules/http2/h2_request.c) moves that write from the shared req->headers table to the current request’s r->headers_in.
Exploitability depends on the build. According to Red Hat, as cited by CIRCL, its RHEL 9 and 10 packages are rated “important” rather than critical, because their memory allocator makes the attack harder, while RHEL 8 and earlier are not affected.
Version 2.4.71 also fixes two other vulnerabilities, according to KrCERT/CC, INCIBE-CERT and BleepingComputer: CVE-2026-106023, a NULL pointer dereference in mod_md (2.4.30 to 2.4.70) that can crash server processes, and CVE-2026-109163, a low-severity stack buffer overflow in mod_vhost_alias (2.4.69 and 2.4.70).
When a server is really exposed
Having mod_http2 installed or loaded is not enough: the vulnerable code is reachable only if the Protocols directive enables h2 (HTTP/2 over TLS) or h2c (cleartext HTTP/2). Apache’s default is Protocols http/1.1. CIRCL points out two cases that are easy to miss:
- a virtual host with its own
Protocolsdirective overrides the global setting, so checking only the main configuration file is not enough; - if a reverse proxy, load balancer or CDN terminates HTTP/2 and speaks only HTTP/1.1 to Apache, the flaw is not reachable from outside; what matters is the actual protocol between the frontend and Apache, not what the public site advertises.
Discovery and exploitation
According to SecurityWeek, the flaw was reported to Apache on 26 October by Anthropic’s OSS Scanner and, independently, on 3 November by Anthony Weems and Simon Scannell of Google Cloud Vulnerability Research.
As of 12 November no source reports real-world attacks: the CVE is not in CISA’s KEV catalog (Ireland’s NCSC) and CERTuy is not aware of confirmed exploitation. The sources differ on exploits: according to SecurityWeek, Red Hat says public research has demonstrated a reliable exploit against a server with mod_http2 enabled, without naming it; a proof of concept published on GitHub, on the other hand, only reproduces memory corruption and process crashes, with no code execution. When it published on 11 November, Wiz was not aware of any public exploit.
Wiz, cited by SecurityWeek and BleepingComputer, found affected versions in 64% of the cloud environments it observes and publicly exposed instances in 51%, without taking into account whether HTTP/2 is enabled. The relevant MITRE ATT&CK technique is T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application).
Impact for European and Italian organisations
Apache is widely used for websites, APIs, portals and shared hosting, including behind CMSs such as WordPress: as Defiant pointed out, CMS updates do not fix a flaw in the underlying web server. Organisations subject to NIS2 should document their instance inventory, exposure assessment and patching timeline, and consider notifying their national CSIRT (CSIRT Italia in Italy) in case of a significant incident. In healthcare, patient and booking portals should be checked first, including those run by third-party suppliers.
What to do now
- Inventory: find every Apache instance, with its version (
apachectl -v), loaded modules (apachectl -M) and virtual hosts (apachectl -S), then look for everyProtocolsdirective in the configuration, virtual hosts included. - Update to 2.4.71 or to your distribution’s fixed package. As CIRCL and CERT.LV advise, on Debian, Ubuntu, Red Hat and similar systems check the distribution’s advisory for the fix, not just the version number. Also update any separately distributed
mod_h2, then restart Apache and check that the running processes use the fixed build. - If you cannot update right away, restrict protocols to
Protocols http/1.1in every virtual host, check the syntax withapachectl -tand reload the service; alternatively, disablemod_http2if nothing else depends on it. This is a temporary measure: the vulnerable code is still there. - Reduce exposure: where possible, use firewall rules or ACLs to limit access to Apache services to authorised networks or proxies only.
- Monitor for abnormal worker crashes, unexpected restarts, unusual child processes, file changes and outbound connections from the web server. If you suspect an attack, preserve the logs: updating does not remove any persistent access established beforehand.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Shield shows, for each machine, the packages with open vulnerabilities, highlighting those already exploited; the ARX Sentry inventory lists the software and processes of servers running the agent, which helps you find Apache instances. ARX Expose shows which of your company’s public services expose recognised products, so you can start with those reachable from the Internet.
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