APT29: watering holes with n-day exploits for iPhone and Android
Sekoia attributes to APT29 a watering hole campaign with three n-day exploit chains for iOS and Android: vectors, CVEs, indicators and what to do.

On 4 November 2026 the French company Sekoia published its analysis of a watering hole campaign against iOS and Android smartphones, discovered in mid-October by its Threat Detection & Research team. The researchers attribute it with “moderate to high” confidence to APT29 (Midnight Blizzard, Cozy Bear), the group tied to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); according to Infosecurity Magazine, Sekoia does not rule out that it is one of its subgroups.
Anyone visiting a compromised site with an outdated phone received, with no further interaction, an exploit chain matched to their device. All the vulnerabilities used were n-days, meaning they had already been fixed by the vendors before the campaign began: Sekoia stresses that a device with an up-to-date operating system is not vulnerable to these attacks. The number of devices actually compromised is not known.
Three vectors, the same code
According to the sources, which agree, the campaign used three routes to bring visitors to the same profiling script:
- direct JavaScript injection into legitimate websites: a Ukrainian gas producer (the first case found), a major US chemical industry trade association, a European far-right political party (Czech, according to Infosecurity Magazine) and a Bulgarian military-related site, where an existing JavaScript library was modified without touching the visible pages. Help Net Security and Security Affairs also mention an Australian medical clinic with no obvious strategic value;
- lookalike domains acting as reverse proxies to the original sites while adding the script:
america250[.]holiday, a copy of the site for the 250th anniversary of US independence, andtheowo[.]club, a copy of the Raffles London at The OWO hotel, close to the UK Ministry of Defence and Downing Street. Sekoia suggests, as an unconfirmed hypothesis, that the second may have been meant to target diplomatic delegations with tailored emails; - supply chain compromise: from 27 August to 3 September 2026 the tracker of the Ukrainian web analytics service Plerdy (
a.plerdy[.]com), loaded by thousands of mostly Ukrainian websites, also delivered the attackers’ script. The exposed sites, hundreds according to SecurityWeek and Infosecurity Magazine, include those of the army, special forces and military equipment makers.
The profiling script, which the attackers call UltimateFingerprinter, sends browser and device data to the server static[.]flux-telemetry[.]com; according to Security Affairs it is hidden inside a minified AngularJS library. Compared with the 2024 campaign against Mongolian government websites documented by Google, there is no filter on target sites here and all browser cookies are collected.
The three exploit chains
- Chain A, iOS 16.7: CVE-2025-43529 and CVE-2024-27834. According to SecurityWeek it reuses DarkSword’s remote code execution code to obtain arbitrary read and write, then uses CVE-2024-27834 to bypass Pointer Authentication (PAC). It steals cookies: Safari’s according to BleepingComputer, app cookies too according to The Record. CISA added CVE-2024-27834 to its KEV catalog on 4 November, without linking it to this campaign.
- Chain B, iOS 18.5: built entirely on the DarkSword kit, with CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510 and CVE-2025-43520. It takes almost everything: SMS and iMessage, mail, voicemail, WhatsApp and Telegram databases, Keychain passwords and tokens, contacts, location, Health data, photos and iCloud Drive.
- Chain C, Chrome for Android 139 to 145 (excluding 143): CVE-2026-3910 in Chrome, fixed in March as a zero-day, and CVE-2025-27038 in the Qualcomm Adreno graphics driver, fixed in the August 2025 Android bulletin. The payload, AndroSnitch, steals Chrome cookies, saved credentials and history, plus Wi-Fi passwords; it resembles AndroSnatch, previously observed by Google TAG in APT29 attacks.
No payload stays on the device: a reboot stops the activity, but the data already sent is lost. According to Security Affairs everything goes to ad.starx-net[.]com:8881/telemetry/v12. BleepingComputer reports four further vulnerabilities present in the code but not used in the analysed chains.
DarkSword is believed to come from a commercial surveillance vendor: according to Ars Technica, Google linked it to customers of the Turkish firm PARS Defense and at least two other actors. Sekoia believes APT29 obtained the exploits from a third party, and that reusing ready-made chains lowers the cost of advanced mobile attacks.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques (our mapping of the reported facts): T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1583.001 acquiring domains, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores.
Impact for European and Italian companies
The targets are mainly in Ukraine and the United States, but the method concerns anyone with outdated company or personal phones that access email and cloud services. Stolen cookies let attackers reuse an already authenticated session, bypassing multi-factor authentication; the Keychain and Chrome passwords open further access. For NIS2 entities, mobile devices are fully part of vulnerability and access management; in healthcare, chain B also takes Health data.
There is another side too: a third-party script loaded by your own website, like the Plerdy tracker, can turn the company site into an attack vector against its own visitors.
What to do now
- Update phones: in the MDM console, find iPhones and iPads without the latest available iOS version (the chains target iOS 16.7 and 18.5) and Android devices with outdated Chrome (versions 139 to 145 are affected) or a patch level older than August 2025. Set a minimum version for access to company data.
- Revoke sessions on devices that were vulnerable and may have visited the sites involved: end active cloud service sessions, change passwords saved in the browser and, if needed, Wi-Fi passwords.
- Look for the indicators in DNS, proxy and firewall logs: the domains listed, paying attention to
a.plerdy[.]combetween 27 August and 3 September (the service is legitimate; the compromise lasted one week). - Protect the most exposed people: for staff who travel or work with government and defence bodies, consider iOS Lockdown Mode.
- Review third-party scripts on the company website: inventory, Content Security Policy and Subresource Integrity where possible.
How ARXDOME helps
With ARX Horizon you can query threat intelligence sources for the published indicators and see matches in the dedicated event family of the SOC pages. Firewall logs collected by ARX Sentry, enriched with threat lists, help you find out whether connections to that infrastructure left the company network. For iPhones and Android phones, the MDM console remains the place to control updates.
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