Check Point: PHP2Shell, TSGA backdoor and a VMware ESXi wiper
Check Point gateways breached via PHP2Shell and CVE-2026-123039: web shells, TSGA backdoor, destroy_v6 wiper on ESXi. Attack chain, indicators, actions.

On 13 November we covered CVE-2026-123039, the privilege escalation in the Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon that CISA had just added to its KEV catalog: at the time it was not known how attackers obtained local access. Check Point Research has now published its reconstruction of the attacks, reported by SecurityWeek, Security Affairs, BleepingComputer and CSO Online: the way in was PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) through the Mobile Access portal of Security Gateways, and in some cases the attack ended with the deletion of files on a VMware ESXi host. According to CSO Online, Check Point says “a couple of dozen” customers were affected.
Two waves
- First wave, from 30 October: Israeli organisations, through unpatched Mobile Access portals, roughly one week after the PHP fix became available. The report, quoted by Security Affairs, names
130.94.19[.]204as the source address. Some victims suffered destructive actions. - Second wave, from 2 November: Security Gateways of organisations in several countries, including some Israeli entities already hit. No destructive activity was observed; according to BleepingComputer, what the attackers did next remains unclear.
According to Check Point, neither wave shows a sector preference: these are opportunistic initial-access attempts, not targeted attacks.
The attack chain
- Initial access. The first signs are PHP session files in
/opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/containing the markerupload_progress_pwn, plus hundreds of crashes of the portal’s Apache and PHP processes: repeated attempts to exploit PHP2Shell. - Root. From the portal service account the attackers move to root by exploiting CVE-2026-123039 (CVSS 7.8) through the DynamicCLI IPC interface. BleepingComputer and CSO Online describe it as a zero-day at the time of the attacks.
- Web shells. Files named
zz*.tplappear in the folder the portal uses to build its login pages: first simple command runners, then versions protected by a hardcoded key that run system commands and PHP code and accept uploads, saved as/tmp/.up.tpland copied aschallenge_render.tpl. - TSGA backdoor. Launched from
/tmp/CPconfigdaemon, it moves itself, restarts asslot_CPconfigdaemonand installs TSProxy at/lib/libcpfwcommon.so. TSGA is built for Check Point appliances: encrypted remote access, configuration theft, persistence through backups and snapshots, process injection and tampering with binary firewall logs. TSProxy runs inside the appliance’s processes and intercepts only the attackers’ connections, leaving other traffic untouched. - Lateral movement and destruction (first wave). With the gogo scanner the attackers map the internal network, then log in over SSH to a VMware ESXi host with the
vpxuseraccount and run the Linux wiper destroy_v6: it recursively deletes the files in a folder, whatever their extension, after overwriting them with zeros (unless run in fast mode), and can skip listed folders.
In every folder the wiper leaves DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, a political message in Hebrew about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that rejects any ransom negotiation and references Dream Security Ltd.; CSO Online describes it as signed by a group calling itself by that name. Dream is the company that in late October documented the PHP2Shell attacks on PAN-OS firewalls, which we covered on 28 October: according to Security Affairs the timing suggests possible retaliation, but the evidence does not establish a motive.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques: T1190, T1068, T1505.003 (Web Shell), T1055 (Process Injection), T1070 (Indicator Removal), T1046 (Network Service Discovery), T1021.004 (SSH), T1485 (Data Destruction).
Attribution: the sources diverge
According to Check Point, TSGA and TSProxy are modified versions of PhiliKit, previously seen in attacks on Ivanti appliances and linked by ESET to the China-nexus group UNC5221: they share code, configuration and encryption, TCP port 11072, the socket /tmp/.p_sock and, for TSProxy, the credentials, TLS certificate and private key of a PhiliKit component. gogo, LightNode VPS servers and the hours of activity (00:00–09:00 UTC) also point to China.
What does not fit is the destruction, the Israeli focus and the Hebrew message. Check Point, quoted by SecurityWeek and Security Affairs, keeps several scenarios open: a single actor running the whole campaign, an initial access broker, a false-flag operation, or destruction used as a smoke screen. BleepingComputer, by contrast, writes that a single actor ran the entire campaign.
Public indicators
- session files containing
upload_progress_pwnand repeated crashes of the portal’s Apache/PHP; - files
zz*.tpl,challenge_render.tpland/tmp/.up.tpl; - processes or files
CPconfigdaemon,slot_CPconfigdaemon,/lib/libcpfwcommon.so; - TCP port 11072, socket
/tmp/.p_sock; - unexplained gaps in firewall logs;
- SSH connections from the gateway to ESXi hosts,
DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt; - the address
130.94.19[.]204.
Impact for European and Italian companies
The sources mention no European victims, but the second wave reached several countries without picking sectors: all it takes is an exposed, unpatched gateway. A gateway with root in the attackers’ hands gives away its configuration, in effect the map of the network, and its logs can no longer be trusted. For NIS2 entities firewalls and VPNs are critical systems, and a compromise must be assessed for notification to the national CSIRT (CSIRT Italia in Italy). In healthcare, virtualisation hosts often run clinical systems: a wiper on ESXi is a business-continuity problem, not just a data problem.
What to do now
- Update: according to BleepingComputer, Check Point recommends the November Jumbo Hotfix on all Management Servers and Security Gateways, starting with those exposing Mobile Access to the internet; it fixes both PHP2Shell and the DynamicCLI flaw.
- If you cannot update right away: according to CSO Online, Check Point advises stopping the
dynamic_serverprocess and preventing it from restarting, at the cost of some CLI commands. - Reduce exposure: turn off Mobile Access where it is not needed and keep management interfaces off the internet.
- Hunt for the indicators on every gateway exposed since late October. Patching does not evict attackers already inside: if compromised, rebuild from trusted images and remember that TSGA also hides in backups and snapshots.
- Separate firewall and virtualisation: no trusted SSH path from the gateway to ESXi hosts; review the use of
vpxuser. - Ship logs off the appliance in real time, to a system the firewall cannot modify.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Sentry collects firewall logs on a central collector, off the appliance, and for firewalls from the main vendors shows policies and firmware status; on servers with the agent it checks file integrity in the chosen folders. ARX Expose shows which of your company’s public services expose recognised products. ARX Horizon brings threat intelligence into a single place, next to the events.
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