OpenIDM default credentials let researchers unlock cars remotely
Default credentials and WAF bypasses on ForgeRock OpenIDM let two researchers remotely unlock and start cars from two automakers.

Security researchers Sam Curry and Shubham Shah (co-founder of Assetnote) published on 7 November 2026 the details of two attack chains against the connected services of two automakers. Starting from the manufacturers’ Android apps, they managed to take over customer accounts and send commands to vehicles: unlocking doors, starting the engine, flashing the headlights and sounding the horn. The two automakers were not named, at their request.
What the two chains have in common is the ForgeRock OpenIDM identity management platform (now part of Ping Identity), used by both automakers for customer logins. The sources do not describe a product vulnerability with a CVE, but configuration and credential management mistakes.
The US chain: an admin console with its default password
According to The Register, to reach the identity servers the researchers had to bypass the web application firewall (WAF) with a path confusion technique, exploiting differences in how the WAF and the application interpret the request path. This let them reach the Apache Felix Web Console, the platform’s OSGi administration console, which still accepted its documented default credentials: the admin:admin pair, as The Hacker News reports.
With administrator privileges on the console, the researchers used the Felix configuration manager to schedule a task that ran an inline Groovy script, giving them a shell on the identity servers. From there they queried the local admin APIs, which can read and modify account data.
Infosecurity Magazine describes the final steps: on a test account the researchers changed the email address and password, then logged in as that customer through the normal app and unlocked and started the test car, with its owner present. The session also exposed the vehicle’s location and telemetry. According to the researchers’ write-up, they could have created a session for any account on the affected deployments; changing the credentials also left the owner’s existing app session active, and notifications could be diverted away from the owner’s phone.
The Australian chain: staging credentials valid in production
The second chain, described by Shah in a separate post, concerns the Australian systems of one of the two automakers. According to The Register:
- starting from a number plate, the researchers obtained the vehicle identification number (VIN) through public licence plate checkers;
- with the VIN they queried internal APIs that returned personal data and the owner’s email address;
- they found hardcoded OpenIDM administrator credentials, meant for the staging environment but also valid in production;
- after bypassing the WAF with a path traversal, they called the internal admin APIs and took over accounts knowing only the email address, minting authentication tokens to send commands to vehicles through the app.
Infosecurity Magazine also mentions a misconfigured multi-factor authentication (MFA) step and lists customers’ names, phone numbers and password hashes among the exposed data.
Fixes and exploitation: what the sources say
- According to Curry’s disclosure timeline, the automakers were contacted in early 2026 and fixed the issue about two hours after the report; Infosecurity Magazine adds that the affected credentials were rotated.
- The sources diverge on the Australian chain: The Register presents the two-hour fix as applying to the whole research, while Infosecurity Magazine writes that Shah’s post, on research carried out in July 2026, does not say when it was reported or whether it has been fixed.
- The Register refers to vehicles in Australia and the US, Infosecurity Magazine to Australia, the US and Canada. The researchers say they tested only on cars they owned or had permission to use.
- No source reports malicious use; according to Infosecurity Magazine the researchers do not say whether they checked for it. Ping Identity did not comment.
- The researchers pointed to ForgeRock’s hardening guidance, which says to remove or protect the console before going into production.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques (indicative mapping)
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: WAF bypass through path traversal and path confusion;
- T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts: console access with the default credentials;
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials: hardcoded administrator credentials;
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Groovy script run through the console;
- T1098 Account Manipulation: changing the email address and password of customer accounts.
Why it matters for European companies too
According to Shah, quoted by The Register, the US chain required much more work because the automaker had spent more time securing its US, Canadian and European OpenIDM environments. The sources do not report any affected European environment.
The lesson, however, applies to anyone running a customer portal or an app backed by an identity management system: a single admin panel with a default password, reachable from the Internet through a bypassable WAF, turns the identity provider into the place from which every account can be compromised. Motor vehicle manufacturers are among the manufacturing sectors covered by the NIS2 directive, and configurations like these are part of the risk management the directive requires.
What to do now
- Inventory the admin consoles of identity providers and IAM platforms (for OpenIDM, the Felix Web Console and the admin APIs): disable them in production or make them reachable only from the management network, following the vendor’s hardening guides.
- Remove default credentials and check that no staging or test credential works in production; rotate any that may have been exposed.
- Look for secrets in mobile apps and distributed clients: administrative credentials must never be in published code.
- Do not rely on the WAF alone: normalise paths in the application, block admin paths upstream and include path traversal and path confusion tests in penetration tests.
- Review internal APIs: no personal data returned from predictable identifiers such as the VIN, and authorisation checked on every call.
- Detection: log and alert on console logins, configuration changes, scheduled tasks and script execution on identity servers, and bulk changes of account emails and passwords.
- Account management: when an email address or password changes, end all active sessions and notify the old address; check that MFA is enforced in every login flow.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Expose shows your company’s attack surface as seen from outside, with known vulnerabilities on public services. With ARX Scout Assessment, on request and with a second authorisation, a non-destructive vulnerability assessment looks for weak configurations and exposed admin panels. To test attack chains like these with a human-led assessment, there is the ARX Probe service run by the Blue Eagle Technology team.
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