Refrigeration controllers: CISA-FBI advisory, XWEB botnet
Joint CISA-FBI advisory on refrigeration controllers, a Hungarian alert on fixed Danfoss versions and Copeland XWEB units turned into a botnet: what’s new.

On ARX News we have already covered the October sabotage of refrigeration controllers in French supermarkets, the CERT-FR alert on Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC units with an exposed interface, and the second wave in November, which reached the EFS blood centres. Below, only what came out on 9 November 2026: the joint advisory from US agencies, which for the first time spells out the fire risk, the Hungarian agency’s alert with the fixed Danfoss versions, and two analyses of Copeland XWEB PRO controllers used for spam, proxying and sabotage.
The advisory from CISA, the FBI and other US agencies
According to Security Affairs, CISA, the FBI, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) published a joint advisory on attacks against electronic temperature controllers and commercial refrigeration controllers and cold chain monitoring systems used in grocery retail and cold storage. The agencies describe the activity as global, also affecting healthcare, chemicals and transport, refrigerated trucks included.
The agencies list three ways in:
- authentication bypass;
- arbitrary code injection;
- weak configurations.
Once inside, an attacker can force continuous heating and defrost cycles. The listed consequences: destroyed stock, shorter equipment life, a fire hazard and, if spoiled products reach consumers, a health risk. The attacker can also hide the damage by taking away operators’ view of the real temperatures. CISA’s Chris Butera urges every organisation that depends on these systems to assume it is a target.
The Hacker News headlines the same advisory with the risk of fires and inventory losses; we were unable to read its text.
The Hungarian alert: Danfoss versions and CVEs
The same day the NKI, Hungary’s national cybersecurity institute (NBSZ NKI), issued an alert on Danfoss refrigeration monitoring systems. It recalls the CERT-FR alert of 12 October and reports that, according to International Cyber Digest, on 13 October Shodan counted 4,980 internet-reachable systems showing Danfoss-related web content, noting that this does not prove they are vulnerable or compromised.
For the AK-SM 8xxA, the NKI summarises the flaws found by Claroty Team82, with the fixed versions:
| CVE | Issue | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-41450 | bypass of the administrator password check | before R4.2 (fixed in R4.2) |
| CVE-2025-41451 | command injection in the email alarm settings, code execution with authenticated access | before R4.3.1 |
| CVE-2025-41452 | web server configuration, which may allow tampering with web traffic or the interface | before R4.3.1 |
The NKI stresses that it is not proven these flaws were used in the French attacks. According to Danfoss, quoted by the NKI, the affected systems ran outdated firmware.
Copeland XWEB: spam, proxies and sabotage
The facts in this section come from a single source, Help Net Security, which reports two analyses.
The botnet (SecurityScorecard). The STRIKE team filtered scan data down to genuine XWEB PRO controllers (originally made by Dixell, now Copeland) and studied their traffic. From 2 November, nine IP addresses were sending email without receiving any; three were XWEB controllers, identified by their TLS certificate or web interface title. The three busiest nodes shared about 47% of their recipients, and 508 of 1,041 targets were hit by at least two nodes: according to the researchers, a single operator. Two other controllers were acting as a tunnel gateway (in Namibia, carrying 71% of the observed traffic) and a residential proxy exit (in Trinidad and Tobago, 10,643 hosts contacted in 17 hours). The most likely way in is CVE-2026-25085, a flaw in the login check that lets an unauthenticated user past the password prompt: it is one of 23 vulnerabilities Claroty Team82 reported to CISA, covered by an advisory in February. SecurityScorecard rates its confidence as low to medium, asks that the IPs be treated as victims, not attacker infrastructure, and does not link the botnet to the attacks in Europe.
The sabotage (Ransom-ISAC). In the early hours of 2 November, the same night as the EFS incident, two administrator sessions from IPs in Australia and the Netherlands read the settings of 31 devices connected to an exposed XWEB Pro and made 743 changes: setpoints of 110 °C and 150 °C, muted alarms, locked local keypads. No vulnerability was needed: the controller still had its factory credentials. Ransom-ISAC has no evidence linking it to the French attacks or to the pro-Russian groups that claimed them, a claim that remains unconfirmed.
Techniques and indicators
From the reported facts, our reading in MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: T0812 (Default Credentials) and T0819 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) for access, T0836 (Modify Parameter) for setpoints and defrost, T0878 (Alarm Suppression) for the muted alarms, T0815 (Denial of View) for the hidden temperatures. For the botnet, in ATT&CK Enterprise, T1584.005 (Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet) and T1090 (Proxy). The sources we read publish no indicators of compromise.
Impact for European and Italian organisations
The picture is widening: not just Danfoss, not just sabotage. An exposed, never-updated controller is a small Linux computer with a fixed IP that nobody watches, useful as a spam relay or proxy for weeks. Food, healthcare, chemicals and transport are NIS2 sectors: for Italian entities (Legislative Decree 138/2024), a compromised controller is an incident to assess for notification to the ACN’s CSIRT Italia, and maintenance contractors’ remote access falls under supply chain security.
What to do now
- No controllers on the internet; if remote access is needed, only behind an up-to-date firewall or gateway, with authorised IP addresses.
- Segment the plant network from the office network.
- Credentials: remove factory defaults, use strong passwords and phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication where possible.
- Update: AK-SM 8xxA at least to R4.3.1; for XWEB units, check with the manufacturer for the fixes in the February CISA advisory; replace unsupported equipment.
- Outbound traffic: a controller sending email or opening thousands of connections is compromised. Block SMTP and unnecessary connections from the plant network.
- Logs and backups: enable logging and review it; if the device does not log, monitor network traffic. Keep configuration backups offline.
- Limits and independent alarms: as Security Affairs notes, a controller should not be able to push a freezer past safe values, whoever gives the order.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Expose shows what an attacker sees from outside, including a controller interface left on the internet, and ARX Scout checks first-hand which ports are actually open. ARX Watch finds devices on the network that have nothing installed, such as plant controllers, and alerts you when a new one appears. With ARX Sentry, firewall logs flow into the portal, so outbound traffic from the plant network can be reviewed too.
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