OpenSSH SSHole (CVE-2026-123158): first attacks within hours
SSHole on Alpine and musl: CVE-2026-123158 (CVSS 8.1), root cause, fixed packages for every branch and a first root login on a honeypot.

📌 Later developments: SSHole joins the KEV catalog with GPUStack, FreeSWITCH and Faspex (November 7, 2026)
On 5 November we reported, based only on the CERT-FR advisories, that OpenSSH before 10.6p2 allows authentication to be bypassed on Linux systems using musl without PAM. In the following days the vulnerability received an identifier, a score and a name, the researcher and the Alpine Linux maintainers published the technical details, and a threat intelligence firm recorded the first exploitation attempts. The new information follows.
Name, CVE and severity
The flaw was named “*sshole” (often written SSHole) by Özgün Kültekin, a researcher at Wakefield, who discovered it and disclosed it on 5 November. It is tracked as CVE-2026-123158 with a CVSS v3 score of 8.1 (high), according to Germany’s BSI, Hungary’s NKI and SecurityWeek; Spain’s INCIBE-CERT rates it as high importance. Ars Technica’s first article, published on the day of disclosure, stated that no CVE had been assigned yet. According to the BSI and the NKI, a public proof of concept exists.
The parties disagree on responsibility: OpenSSH considers the root cause to lie outside sshd, although it is exploitable and avoidable there; musl developer Rich Felker, quoted by Ars Technica, describes it as incorrect use of the library by the caller, but musl plans to change the mechanism. According to SecurityWeek, OpenSSH shipped the fix the day after learning of the problem, avoiding a long embargo because AI agents quickly rediscover bugs.
Why a long password opens the account
The sources describe the same chain, the result of three independent choices:
- since 2012, musl has rejected SHA-256 and SHA-512 passwords longer than 256 bytes and, when
crypt()fails, returns the string*instead of an error; - since 2016, to fix user enumeration through response timing (CVE-2016-6210), OpenSSH computes a hash even when the account has no usable hash, borrowing the salt of another local account;
- Alpine has long used an asterisk in the
/etc/shadowpassword field for accounts that must not accept passwords, including root since 3.16.
With a password between 257 and 1,024 characters, crypt() returns *, sshd compares it with the stored * and the login succeeds. A single connection is enough. According to the NKI, the sshd fix rejects any match when the stored hash is shorter than four characters.
Which accounts and which systems
Besides musl, sshd without PAM and password authentication enabled (the conditions already known), the sources specify that the attack needs:
- a target account with only
*in the password field, whose name the attacker knows; accounts locked with!are not affected (NKI); - another local account with a
$5$or$6$hash, from which sshd takes the salt; according to Check Point, quoted by Ars Technica, the target account must also be active.
Accounts at risk include root (reachable directly only if PermitRootLogin has been relaxed from the default prohibit-password), users created for key-only access, directory users without a local shadow entry (musl-nscd according to Alpine; nslcd, winbind and sssd according to the NKI) and the alpine user of the official AWS and Azure cloud images (tiny-cloud, 3.18.11 to 3.24.3), which has passwordless doas: from there, root is one step away.
Alpine’s openssh-server package is built without PAM; INCIBE-CERT notes that openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no is also affected. Containers running sshd are in scope, those without an SSH server are not (CERT Bulgaria). The researcher also lists OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto, but Ars Technica points out that OpenWrt uses Dropbear as its default server and that Buildroot and Yocto are not confirmed. Systems with glibc (Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora), setups with PAM enabled, Dropbear and OpenBSD are not affected.
First exploitation attempts
The sources differ depending on when they were published. On 6 November INCIBE-CERT reported “no exploitation” and the NKI no confirmed attacks; the CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog. The same day Previdian, quoted by Help Net Security and The Hacker News, reported a first attempt less than nine hours after the CVE was published and root access on one of its honeypots running real Alpine Linux and OpenSSH.
The eight attempts recorded by a single sensor came from one address in Japan, 89.116.89[.]18, using oversized passwords and reconnaissance commands (id, uname, hostname) in non-interactive SSH sessions: in MITRE ATT&CK terms, valid accounts over SSH (T1078, T1021.004) and system discovery (T1082, T1033). This comes from a single source. Previdian also warns that the proofs of concept posted on GitHub are unverified and could contain malware.
Fixed Alpine versions
INCIBE-CERT, drawing on the Alpine advisory, lists the fixed openssh package for each branch:
| Branch | Fixed package |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 | 9.0_p1-r6 |
The NKI lists 3.24.4, 3.23.8, 3.22.8 and 3.21.10 as fixed releases and notes that no fix is expected for versions older than 3.16.
What to do now
- Update the package (
apk upgrade openssh) and restart sshd (rc-service sshd restart): until it restarts, the old process keeps accepting logins. - Rebuild images and base containers created before the fixes: they remain vulnerable.
- If you cannot update, set
PasswordAuthentication noin the effective configuration (check it withsshd -T) after confirming, from an open session, that key-based login works. The NKI suggestsopenssh-server-pamwithUsePAM yesas an alternative. - Do not rely on the asterisk for “key-only” accounts: disable passwords in sshd, globally or with a
Matchblock. - Hunt for traces beyond the command described in our previous article:
doasusage, recently created users, changes toauthorized_keysfiles, connections from 89.116.89[.]18. Alpine and SOCRadar advise treating any server where a login cannot be ruled out as compromised.
Impact for European and Italian companies
Alpine is widely used as a container base and the NKI also points to musl-based firmware in embedded and network devices, to be checked with the vendor. For NIS2 entities, the inventory must cover images, containers and appliances, not just servers, with log checks documented. The NKI recommends not exposing SSH directly to the Internet, but through a VPN or bastion host with restricted sources.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Shield shows open vulnerabilities per machine and per package, highlighting those already exploited. ARX Sentry collects inventory and login logs from Linux servers and shows successful and privileged logins in its identity pages. ARX Expose and ARX Scout show which public addresses expose SSH; ARX Radar shows who is attacking the perimeter right now.
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