Qilin: an OSINT investigation names the admin “Haise”
KrebsOnSecurity traces the alleged identity of Qilin’s leader, the most active ransomware, through old handles, reused emails and leaks. What to do.

Qilin is currently the most active ransomware-as-a-service programme in the world: according to KrebsOnSecurity it has claimed at least 365 organisations in the past three months, and an NCC Group report published this month ranks it first among RaaS groups. On 11 November 2026 Brian Krebs published an investigation that, by combining data from several threat intelligence firms, attributes the role of the group’s administrator, known by the handle “Haise”, to a specific person.
The three sources for this story all rely on the same investigation: Insicurezza Digitale analyses it and adds technical background on the malware, while DataBreaches.net republishes it. So far there is no judicial confirmation and no public reaction from Qilin.
What happened
According to KrebsOnSecurity, the trail leading to Haise’s identity starts with a classic mistake: reusing old online identities.
- The RAMP forum. Intel 471 indexed the private messages of RAMP, a Russian forum created as a haven for ransomware affiliate programmes and seized by the FBI in January 2026. In June 2022 the forum administrator approved Haise’s membership application, also citing their Telegram account, Alexbigboss44.
- Earlier handles. The same Telegram account had been shared in 2020 by the user “Rjun” on the Exploit and XSS forums. Rjun was also a long-standing member of Darkmarket, Verified and Zloy, always registered with the same email address.
- The criminal profile. According to Flashpoint, Alexbigboss44 traded traffic, stolen logs and corporate access, and bought compromised Facebook and Google Ads accounts in bulk for advertising fraud and gambling schemes.
- Passwords and leaks. According to SpyCloud, that email was used with a password containing the handle “Rjun”. Constella Intelligence found it in data stolen from Gosuslugi, the Russian public services portal breached in late 2025 (more than 20 million records, as reported): the address is linked to a 36-year-old man from St Petersburg, whom Krebs identifies as Aleksey Mikhailovich Yakovtsev.
- Cross-checks. The Telegram ID used by Haise since 2018 leads to a phone number and further email addresses linked to the same person and their family. IntelHawk, the platform that first flagged the connection, also using writing-style analysis (stylometry), describes a progression from small-time fraudster in 2018–2019 to organiser of complex criminal activity in 2020–2023. The anonymous GangExposed account reached similar conclusions.
Krebs says he tried to reach Yakovtsev by email and phone without success. This is a journalistic attribution based on open sources and leaked data: unless and until there are legal proceedings, the identity remains alleged.
The group: technical data and business model
- Origin. According to KrebsOnSecurity, Qilin has been operating since September 2022; Insicurezza Digitale traces the code back to August 2022, when Trend Micro described a Go ransomware called Agenda, rewritten in Rust in December 2022 and showing similarities with Black Basta, BlackMatter and REvil.
- Affiliation. Affiliates keep at least 80% of ransoms according to KrebsOnSecurity, between 80 and 85% according to Insicurezza Digitale. The core team provides the malware, infrastructure and leak site.
- Double extortion. Data is stolen before encryption and used as additional leverage: in MITRE ATT&CK terms, exfiltration (tactic TA0010) followed by data encrypted for impact (T1486).
- English-speaking affiliates. Unlike many Russian-speaking groups, Qilin accepts English-speaking affiliates; its leader has claimed on Telegram to have worked with Scattered Spider and RansomHub.
The Alexbigboss44 profile also shows the market that feeds ransomware: infostealer logs and corporate access bought and resold. For victims, this almost always means attackers getting in with valid accounts (T1078).
Why it matters for European and Italian companies
According to Insicurezza Digitale, the victims claimed by Qilin over the past two years include public bodies, hospitals, manufacturing and education, also in Europe. The investigation does not stop the group: people living in Russia are unlikely to be arrested, and the affiliate programme remains active. It may, however, erode affiliates’ trust and provide material for future sanctions or investigations.
For entities in scope of NIS2 (in Italy, Legislative Decree 138/2024), an attack of this kind is an incident to be notified to the national CSIRT; in healthcare the stolen data is often special category data under the GDPR, with notification obligations to the data protection authority.
What to do now
- Protect remote access: multi-factor authentication on VPN, remote desktop and cloud services, and no administration services exposed to the Internet unless strictly necessary.
- Check for stolen credentials: find out whether company accounts appear in leaks or infostealer logs and force a reset of the affected passwords; ban password reuse across services.
- Watch for exfiltration: unusual outbound volumes, unexpected sync or transfer tools, access to file shares outside working hours.
- Segment the network to limit lateral movement, and keep backup servers outside the domain.
- Keep offline or immutable backups and test restores regularly.
- Monitor leak sites: a claim in your name, or in the name of a supplier, must be checked against your logs straight away.
How ARXDOME helps
ARX Expose flags company accounts involved in breaches and shows among its findings whether your company’s name appears in a ransomware claim. ARX Sentry collects logs and events from computers, servers and firewalls and groups failed logons, explicit credential use and privileged access. ARX Shield lets you isolate a suspicious machine from the network with one click, and ARX Trace reconstructs the facts with the evidence collected by the probes.
Last updated:


