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NewsNovember 10, 20264 min read

Xen Orchestra: authentication bypass exploited in attacks

A cookie holding an empty JSON object grants admin access to Xen Orchestra: flaw VSA-2026-062 is exploited, XCP-ng hosts at risk. Versions, IoCs and actions.

Data center corridor with rows of blue-lit servers and streaks of light running towards the far end

Vates, the French company that develops Xen Orchestra, has warned that a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in the platform is being actively exploited. The news is reported by BleepingComputer, The Hacker News and SecurityWeek. Xen Orchestra is the web interface used to manage XCP-ng virtualization environments (and, according to SecurityWeek, XenServer as well): virtual machines, hosts, pools, storage and backups. Whoever controls it effectively controls the entire virtual infrastructure.

The vendor advisory tracks the flaw as VSA-2026-062. When the sources were published, neither a CVE identifier nor a CVSS score had been assigned. BleepingComputer credits the discovery to Filip Magic and Christoffer Olsen of TDC NET Security.

How the vulnerability works

The defect lies in the authentication mechanism of the Xen Orchestra REST API. According to the sources, based on the Vates advisory:

  • the attacker sends a request with the cookie authenticationToken=j:%7B%7D, i.e. an empty JSON object ({});
  • the server treats that value as an unfiltered lookup in the token collection and returns the first existing token;
  • if that token has not expired, the request is authenticated as its owner, with no credentials;
  • through the /rest/v0/users/me/authentication_tokens endpoint the attacker can then read reusable login token IDs and keep access.

The result is access with administrator privileges. Vates warns that a Xen Orchestra compromise can lead to arbitrary code execution on managed pools and a full takeover of XCP-ng nodes as root. Network access to the management interface is all it takes: instances reachable from the Internet or from poorly segmented networks are the most exposed.

Affected versions and fixes: the sources diverge

Xen Orchestra and the Xen Orchestra Appliance (XOA), which contains it, are affected. The two sources whose text is available do not agree on the fixed versions:

  • according to BleepingComputer, the fixes are in Xen Orchestra 6.9.1 (stable) and 6.10.0 (latest), with xo-server packages 5.211.2 and 5.213.1;
  • according to SecurityWeek, releases before 6.9.2 (stable) and before 6.10.1 (latest) are vulnerable.

Until you can check advisory VSA-2026-062, the cautious choice is to move at least to 6.9.2 or 6.10.1, or in any case to the latest version of your channel.

A second flaw still without a fix

Only SecurityWeek reports that the same actor also used a second zero-day vulnerability alongside the bypass. It requires administrator privileges and allows malicious virtual machine imports that can compromise XCP-ng hosts. According to the outlet, the fix is still in development. In an attack chain, the bypass supplies exactly the administrator privileges this second flaw needs: until a patch is out, reducing the exposure of the interface remains the main defence.

Indicators of compromise

Vates has published indicators tied to the observed campaign, reported by BleepingComputer and partly by SecurityWeek:

  • connections to 91.211.251.112:8001 or to the Tor service ustar3rqxgnskzgnwkgpofgtvxevm6cx3lxdbwt4mndtveqyaohid.onion:3333;
  • HTTP requests with the cookie authenticationToken=j:%7B%7D or authenticationToken=j:{};
  • a virtual machine named pivot2;
  • VMs configured with the hvm_serial: file parameter (serial port to a file);
  • the files /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar, /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar2, /.ustar5 and /.ustar6.

On XCP-ng hosts, the suggested checks are:

xe vm-list params=name-label,platform | grep -B1 'hvm_serial: file'
zgrep -- '-serial file:' /var/log/xensource.log*
ls -la /etc/ld.so.preload /.ustar* /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar*

Two important warnings from the vendor: exploitation leaves no trace in Xen Orchestra logs, so it must be looked for in HTTP traffic (proxy, WAF, load balancer logs); and the indicators only apply to this campaign. As SecurityWeek reports, their absence is not enough to rule out a compromise. In MITRE ATT&CK terms, the public elements point to T1190 (exploit public-facing application), T1053.003 (cron persistence) and T1090.003 (multi-hop proxy via Tor).

Impact for Italian and European companies

The risk concerns every company or service provider that manages XCP-ng with Xen Orchestra, and it grows if the interface is reachable from networks not dedicated to management. An attacker controlling the hypervisor can stop, copy or modify any virtual machine, including domain controllers, databases and backup systems. For NIS2 entities, a compromise at this level is very likely a significant incident, requiring an early warning within 24 hours. In healthcare, where virtualized environments often host clinical and administrative systems, the impact on service continuity can be direct.

What to do now

  1. Update Xen Orchestra and XOA to the latest version of your channel (at least 6.9.2 or 6.10.1, given the divergence between the sources).
  2. Take the interface off the Internet: place it on a dedicated management network, reachable only via VPN or from administrative workstations.
  3. Block the empty token with a WAF or reverse proxy rule on the cookie authenticationToken=j:{} (including the encoded form), and block the known addresses and domains of the campaign.
  4. Hunt for the indicators with the commands provided by the vendor and in historical HTTP traffic to the interface.
  5. Rotate passwords, tokens and secrets used by the virtualization environment.
  6. In case of confirmed compromise, Vates recommends a full reinstallation: cleanup alone cannot guarantee that all backdoors are removed.

How ARXDOME helps

ARX Expose shows whether the management interface is reachable from outside, among the exposed services of your attack surface. ARX Sentry collects logs and events from servers and firewalls, where you can search for connections to the attacker’s infrastructure, and ARX Horizon enriches every address with reputation and Tor usage, so that traffic stands out in the SOC pages.

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