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NewsNovember 11, 20264 min read

Poland takes ePUAP offline as a precaution after a cyberattack

Poland shut down ePUAP, its online public services platform, after stopping a cyberattack: what is known, what is missing and what to do now.

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On 10 November 2026 the Polish government took ePUAP offline. ePUAP is the national platform that citizens and businesses use to submit official documents, communicate with public offices and complete administrative procedures online. Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski wrote on X that a cyberattack against the system had been “detected and stopped”, that the teams responsible for its security acted immediately to keep it stable, and that technical work is under way to restore full functionality.

The news was reported by The Record, Security Affairs and heise Security. The first two outlets agree on all the main points.

What we know

  • A precautionary shutdown, not an outage. According to ministry spokesperson Marek Gieorgica, speaking to the Polish news agency PAP, the system was not compromised and its operation was not disrupted by the attack: the platform was switched off as a precaution.
  • Core infrastructure intact. The minister stated that the infrastructure of the Central Information Technology Centre (COI), the agency that runs ePUAP and other key state digital services, remains secure.
  • Affected services. According to a notice on the government website, ePUAP electronic mailboxes are unavailable to both citizens and public institutions. The disruption may also temporarily affect the Trusted Profile (Profil Zaufany), the digital identity used to access public services and sign documents electronically.
  • No restoration date. The ministry said services will return once security specialists have completed their checks.

What we don’t know

The authorities have not explained how the attack was carried out or who is behind it. There is no public confirmation that the attackers accessed government systems or stole data. No attack vector, exploited vulnerabilities, techniques or indicators of compromise have been published: anyone looking for IoCs to load into their detection tools will not find any for now.

One more detail is worth keeping in mind: “detected and stopped” and “not compromised” are statements from the ministry, not yet backed by a technical report. Until data is available, the only honest reading is the one in the sources: an attack that was intercepted and a platform switched off out of caution.

The Polish context

The Record notes that in recent months Poland has faced several attacks against public institutions, critical infrastructure and private companies. In October the online invoicing service Fakturownia disclosed a breach that may have exposed data of users, customers and business partners (Security Affairs also mentions it). Only The Record also cites the theft of data in September from Qbusoft, a Polish healthcare software provider, after a separate breach involving the medical technology company MyDr: according to Polish authorities, the MyDr incident potentially concerns data of about 19 million people and roughly 12,000 healthcare organisations.

Why it matters to European and Italian businesses

The ePUAP case shows a risk that applies to anyone relying on a centralised public platform: even without damage, a precautionary shutdown stops every process that runs through it. As Security Affairs points out, someone with a filing deadline has a real problem even if no data was lost.

  • Companies operating in Poland: procedures that go through ePUAP and the Trusted Profile may stay blocked for a period nobody can predict today.
  • All organisations: the same pattern applies to the public platforms our own processes depend on, from digital identity to certified email. An outage, even of a few hours, belongs in business continuity plans.
  • NIS2: central government public administration entities fall within the scope of the directive, which requires incident handling and business continuity. Deciding to switch off a service to contain an attack is a response decision that should be prepared in advance, not improvised.

What to do now

  1. Map your external dependencies: list the business processes that rely on public portals or digital identity services and, for each one, define an alternative channel and who decides when to use it.
  2. If you operate in Poland: check upcoming deadlines, follow the official Polish government notices on alternative channels and keep a record showing the platform could not be used.
  3. Watch out for themed phishing: public incidents are often used as bait. It is wise to warn the people who handle Polish procedures to distrust emails about “ePUAP restoration” or requests to log in again to the Trusted Profile, and to reach the services only through the official addresses.
  4. Prepare your own shutdown decision: define in advance who can take an exposed service offline, on what criteria and with what communication to users and authorities. Preserve logs and evidence before acting, so that later analysis remains possible.
  5. Keep an eye on updates: if the Polish authorities publish technical details or indicators, check them against your own systems.

How ARXDOME helps

ARX Expose flags domains that look like yours, typical of phishing campaigns that exploit a well-known incident. ARX Radar shows the attacks under way against your perimeter, based on firewall logs, and ARX Sentry brings logs and events from computers, servers and firewalls into the SOC: the information you need to decide quickly whether and what to isolate, with the evidence already collected.

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